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Is There a Bubble 
in the Housing Market?
The popular press is full of speculation that the United States, as well as
other countries, is in a “housing bubble” that is about to burst. Barrons,
Money magazine, and The Economist have all run recent feature stories
about the irrational run-up in home prices and the potential for a crash.
The Economist has published a series of articles with titles like “Castles in
Hot Air,” “House of Cards,” “Bubble Trouble,” and “Betting the House.”
These accounts have necessarily raised concerns among the general pub-
lic. But how do we know if the housing market is in a bubble?
The term “bubble” is widely used but rarely clearly deﬁned. We
believe that in its widespread use the term refers to a situation in which
excessive public expectations of future price increases cause prices to be
temporarily elevated. During a housing price bubble, homebuyers think
that a home that they would normally consider too expensive for them is
now an acceptable purchase because they will be compensated by signiﬁ-
cant further price increases. They will not need to save as much as they
otherwise might, because they expect the increased value of their home to
do the saving for them. First-time homebuyers may also worry during a
housing bubble that if they do not buy now, they will not be able to afford
a home later. Furthermore, the expectation of large price increases may
have a strong impact on demand if people think that home prices are very
unlikely to fall, and certainly not likely to fall for long, so that there is lit-
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motivating factors for buyers, then home prices are inherently unstable.
Prices cannot go up rapidly forever, and when people perceive that prices
have stopped going up, this support for their acceptance of high home
prices could break down. Prices could then fall as a result of diminished
demand: the bubble bursts. 
At least one aspect of a housing bubble—the rapid price increases—
has clearly been seen recently. A rapid surge in home prices after 2000, as
tabulated, for example, by the Economist Intelligence Service, has been
seen in almost all the advanced economies of the world, with the excep-
tion of Germany and Japan. In some of these countries, price-to-rental
ratios and price-to-average income ratios are at levels not seen since their
data begin in 1975.1
But the mere fact of rapid price increases is not in itself conclusive evi-
dence of a bubble. The basic questions that still must be answered are
whether expectations of large future price increases are sustaining the
market, whether these expectations are salient enough to generate anxi-
eties among potential homebuyers, and whether there is sufﬁcient conﬁ-
dence in such expectations to motivate action. 
In addition, changes in fundamentals may explain much of the
increase. As we will show, income growth alone explains the pattern of
recent home price increases in most states. Falling interest rates clearly
explain much of the recent run-up nationally; they can also explain some
of the cross-state variation in appreciation because of differences in the
elasticities of supply of homes, including land. 
To shed light on whether the current boom is a bubble and whether it is
likely to burst or deﬂate, we present two pieces of new evidence. First, we
analyze U.S. state-level data on home prices and the “fundamentals,”
including income, over a period of seventy-one quarters from 1985 to
2002. 
Second, we present the results of a new questionnaire survey con-
ducted in 2003 of people who bought homes in 2002 in four metropolitan
areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, and Milwaukee. The survey
replicates one we did in these same metropolitan areas in 1988, during
another purported housing bubble, after which prices did indeed fall
sharply in many cities. The results of the new survey thus allow compari-
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compare metropolitan areas that have reputedly gone through a bubble
recently (Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston) with one that has not
(Milwaukee). 
The notion of a bubble is really deﬁned in terms of people’s thinking:
their expectations about future price increases, their theories about the
risk of falling prices, and their worries about being priced out of the hous-
ing market in the future if they do not buy. Economists rarely ask people
what they are thinking when they make economic decisions, and some
economists have argued that one should never do so.2 We disagree. If
questions are carefully worded and people are surveyed at a time close to
their making an actual economic decision, then by making comparisons
across time and economic circumstances, we can learn about how the
decisions are made.3
On the Origin of the Term “Housing Bubble”
There is very little agreement about housing bubbles. In fact, the
widespread use of the term “housing bubble” is itself quite new. Figure 1
shows a monthly count since 1980 of stories incorporating the words
“housing bubble” in major newspapers in the English language around
the world, as tabulated using Lexis-Nexis. (The data in years before 2003
are rescaled to account for the smaller coverage of Lexis-Nexis in earlier
years.) The term “housing bubble” had virtually no currency until 2002,
when its use suddenly increased dramatically, even though the run-up in
real estate prices in the 1980s was as big as that since 1995. The peak in
usage of “housing bubble” occurred in October 2002. The only real evi-
dence of its currency before 2002 is a few uses of the term just after the
stock market crash of 1987, but that usage quickly died out.
The term “housing boom” has appeared much more frequently since
1980. As ﬁgure 1 also shows, the use of this term was fairly steady from
1980 through 2001, although it, too, took off in 2002, also peaking in
October. The term “boom” is much more neutral than “bubble” and sug-
gests that the rise in prices may be an opportunity for investors. In contrast,
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opinion that price levels cannot be sustained. 
Perhaps journalists are shy about using the word “bubble” except after
some salient public event that legitimizes the possibility, such as the stock
market crash of 1987 or that after 2000. The question is whether such
journalistic use of the term also infects the thinking of homebuyers: do
homebuyers think that they are in a bubble? 
The Previous “Housing Bubble”
The period of the 1980s and the declines in housing prices in many
cities in the early 1990s are now widely looked back upon as an example,
even a model, of a boom cycle that led to a bust. A pattern of sharp price
increases, with a peak around 1990 followed by a decline in many impor-
tant cities around the world, including Boston, Los Angeles, London,
Sydney, and Tokyo, looks consistent with a bubble.
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Figure 1. Appearances of “Housing Bubble” and “Housing Boom”
in U.S. Newspapers and Wire Services, 1980–2003a
Source: Lexis-Nexis.
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home prices in the Boston metropolitan area went up 39 percent. In a
1986 paper, Case constructed repeat-sales indexes to measure the extent
of the boom in constant-quality home prices.4 The same paper reported
that a structural supply-and-demand model, which explained home price
movements over ten years and across ten cities, failed to explain what
was going on in Boston. The model predicted that income growth,
employment growth, interest rates, construction costs, and other funda-
mentals should have pushed Boston housing prices up by about 15 per-
cent. Instead, they went up over 140 percent before topping out in 1988.
The paper ended with the conjecture that the boom was at least in part a
bubble.
The following year we described price changes by constructing a set of
repeat-sales indexes from large databases of transactions in Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco.5 We used these indexes in a subse-
quent paper to provide evidence of positive serial correlation in the
changes in real home prices.6 In fact, that paper showed that a change in
price observed over one year tends to be followed by a change in the same
direction the following year between 25 and 50 percent as large. The
paper found evidence of inertia in excess returns as well. This strong ser-
ial correlation of price changes is certainly consistent with our expecta-
tion of a bubble.7
During the 1980s, spectacular home price booms in California and the
Northeast helped stimulate the underlying economy on the way up, but
they ultimately encountered a substantial drop in demand in the late 1980s
and contributed signiﬁcantly to severe regional recessions in the early
1990s. The end of the 1980s boom led to sharp price declines in some, but
not all, cities. 
Since 1995, U.S. housing prices have been rising faster than incomes
and faster than other prices in virtually every metropolitan area. Despite
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2001, and despite the loss of nearly 3 million jobs since 2000, prices of
single-family homes, the volume of existing home sales, and the number
of housing starts in the United States have remained at near-record levels.
There can be no doubt that the housing market and spending related to
housing sales have kept the U.S. economy growing and have prevented a
double-dip recession since 2001. 
The big question is whether there is reason to think that such a run-up
in prices will be followed by a similar or even worse decline than the last
time. To answer this question, we need to try to understand better the
causes of these large movements in the housing market.
Home Prices and the Fundamentals, 1985–2002
A fundamental issue to consider when judging the plausibility of bub-
ble theories is the stability of the relationship between income and other
fundamentals and home prices over time and space. Here we look at the
relationship between home price and personal income per capita and a
number of other variables by state, using quarterly data from 1985:1 to
2002:3. The data contain 3,621 observations covering all ﬁfty states and
the District of Columbia.8
Measures of Home Prices
The series of home values was constructed from repeat-sales price
indexes applied to the 2000 census median values by state. Case-Shiller
(CS) weighted repeat-sales indexes constructed by Fiserv CSW Inc. are
available for sixteen states.9 In addition, the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) makes state-level repeat-value indexes
produced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac available for all states. 
The Case-Shiller indexes are the best available for our purposes, and
wherever possible we use them. Although OFHEO uses a similar index
construction methodology (the weighted repeat-sales method of Case and
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sively on arm’s-length transactions. CS indexes use controls, to the extent
possible, for changes in property characteristics, and it can be shown that
they pick up turns in price direction earlier and more accurately than do
the OFHEO indexes. Nonetheless, for capturing broad movements over
long periods, the indexes tend to track each other quite well, and OFHEO
indexes are used in most states to achieve broader coverage. 
The panel on home prices was constructed as follows for each state: 
where
Vi
t = adjusted median home value in state i at time t
Vi
1999:1 = median value of owner-occupied homes in state i in 1999:1
Ii
t = weighted repeat-sales price index for state i at time t, 
1999:1 = 1.0.
The baseline ﬁgures for state-level median home prices are based on
owner estimates in the 2000 census. A number of studies have attempted
to measure the bias in such estimates. The estimates range from –2 per-
cent to +6 percent.11
Measures of the Fundamentals
Data on personal income per capita by state are available from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis website. The series is a consistent time
series produced on a timely (monthly) schedule. 
Population ﬁgures by state are not easy to obtain on a quarterly basis.
The most carefully constructed series that we could ﬁnd was put together
by Economy.com (formerly Regional Financial Associates). 
The most stable and reliable measure of employment at the state level is
the nonfarm payroll employment series from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) Establishment Survey, which is available monthly, and which
we have converted to quarterly data.
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part of its Household Survey.
Data on housing starts are not generally available by state before 1995.
The series used here was produced by Economy.com based on the histor-
ical relationship between permits and starts and a proprietary data base on
permits. 
Data on average mortgage interest rates on thirty-year ﬁxed rate mort-
gages, assuming payment of 2 points (2 percent of the loan value) and an
80 percent loan-to-value ratio, are available from Fannie Mae.
For each quarter the ratio of income to mortgage payment per $1,000
borrowed was calculated by dividing annual income per capita by twelve
(to convert it to monthly) and then dividing by the monthly mortgage pay-
ment per $1,000 of loan value for a thirty-year ﬁxed rate with 2 points.
Home Prices and Income: A First Look 
Table 1 presents ratios of home price to annual income per capita for
the eight states where prices have been most volatile and the seven states
where they have been least volatile. The least volatile states exhibit
remarkable stability and very low ratios. The ratio for Wisconsin, for
example, a state that we will explore at some length later, remains
between 2.1 and 2.4 for the entire eighteen years of our sample. A simple
regression of home prices on income per capita in Wisconsin generates an
R2 of 0.99.
On the other hand, the eight most volatile states exhibit equally
remarkable instability. Connecticut’s ratio, for example, varies between
4.5 and 7.8, and we ﬁnd that income explains only 45 percent of the vari-
ation in home prices. Table 2 shows the variation for all ﬁfty states and
the District of Columbia. Glancing down the table reveals that forty-three
of the ﬁfty-one observations have a standard deviation below 0.41,
whereas only those eight states listed in table 1 as most volatile have stan-
dard deviations above 0.41. These calculations reveal that states seem to
fall into one of two categories. In the vast majority of states, prices move
very much in line with income. But in New England, New York, New Jer-
sey, California, and Hawaii, prices are signiﬁcantly more volatile.
Plots of the ratio of price to income per capita for the states of Califor-
nia, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (ﬁgure 2) show clearly that the pattern
306 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 306of variation is anything but a random walk. In California and Massachu-
setts the pattern is one of a long inertial upswing followed by a long iner-
tial downturn followed by another rise that has now lasted several years.
In Wisconsin the ratio is much smaller and remarkably stable.
We conclude that whereas income alone almost completely explains
home price increases in the vast majority of states, about eight states are
characterized by large swings in home prices that exhibit strong inertia
and cannot be well explained by income patterns.
Home Prices and Other Fundamentals
To explore the relationship between housing prices and other funda-
mental variables, we performed linear and log-linear reduced-form
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Table 1. Ratio of Average Home Price to Personal Income per Capita and Results of
Regressions Explaining Home Prices, Selected States, 1985–2002
R2 of regression of 
home price ona
Income   Other  
Standard In Quarter per fundamental
State Trough Peak deviation 2002:3 of peak capita variablesb
States with most volatile home prices
Hawaii 7.8 12.5 1.34 10.1 1992:3 0.83 0.89
Connecticut 4.5 7.8 1.06 5.4 1988:1 0.45 0.69
New Hampshire 4.0 6.6 0.84 5.3 1987:2 0.49 0.78
California 6.0 8.6 0.80 8.3 1989:4 0.78 0.89
Rhode Island 4.6 7.1 0.75 6.1 1988:1 0.65 0.79
Massachusetts 4.3 6.6 0.72 5.9 1987:3 0.70 0.88
New Jersey 4.5 6.8 0.68 5.6 1987:3 0.73 0.90
New York 3.8 5.6 0.52 4.9 1987:3 0.77 0.86
States with least volatile home prices
Nebraska 1.8 2.1 0.09 1.9 1985:2 0.96 0.99
Wisconsin 2.1 2.4 0.08 2.4 2002:3 0.99 0.99
Illinois 2.6 2.9 0.08 2.9 2002:3 0.98 0.99
Kentucky 2.1 2.4 0.08 2.2 1985:1 0.99 0.99
Indiana 2.0 2.3 0.06 2.1 1986:4 0.99 0.99
Iowa 1.7 1.9 0.06 1.8 2002:3 0.98 0.99
Ohio 2.3 2.5 0.04 2.5 2002:3 0.99 0.99
Sources: Fiserv CSW Inc., OFHEO, and Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
a. Observations are for the seventy-one quarters from 1985:1 through 2002:3.
b. Regressions use as additional explanatory variables the following fundamental variables: population, nonfarm payroll
employment, the unemployment rate, housing starts, and mortgage interest rates.
Ratio
1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 307308 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Table 2. Ratio of Home Price to Personal Income per Capita, All States, 1985–2002a
Standard 
State Median Trough Peak deviation Mean
Hawaii 9.79 7.83 12.50 1.34 10.03
Connecticut 5.41 4.47 7.84 1.06 5.67
New Hampshire 4.68 3.98 6.63 0.84 4.94
California 6.76 5.96 8.57 0.80 7.07
Rhode Island 5.49 4.58 7.12 0.75 5.62
Massachusetts 4.97 4.34 6.60 0.72 5.20
New Jersey 5.25 4.48 6.77 0.68 5.34
New York 4.54 3.83 5.60 0.52 4.55
Texas 2.48 2.20 3.59 0.41 2.61
Maine 3.98 3.44 4.77 0.40 3.98
District of Columbia 3.61 3.10 4.52 0.37 3.66
Vermont 4.11 3.64 4.85 0.37 4.19
Louisiana 2.56 2.42 3.53 0.33 2.70
Alaska 3.26 2.48 4.07 0.33 3.29
Oregon 2.25 1.49 2.69 0.32 2.23
Utah 2.87 2.29 3.21 0.31 2.81
Mississippi 2.28 2.21 3.15 0.29 2.43
Maryland 4.01 3.62 4.69 0.29 4.05
Oklahoma 2.13 2.05 3.04 0.28 2.25
Washington 3.12 2.28 3.36 0.26 3.00
Delaware 3.62 3.33 4.14 0.26 3.69
Colorado 2.60 2.19 3.18 0.25 2.57
Virginia 3.47 3.04 3.87 0.24 3.44
Georgia 2.76 2.58 3.25 0.23 2.83
Arizona 3.53 3.38 4.17 0.22 3.63
North Dakota 2.24 2.05 2.98 0.22 2.32
Arkansas 2.22 2.13 2.84 0.22 2.33
(continued)
regressions with three dependent variables: the level of home prices, the
quarter-to-quarter change in home prices, and the price-to-income ratio
described above. The results for the linear versions of these regressions are
given in tables 1 and 3; the results for the log-linear regressions are similar.
In those states where income and home prices are very highly correlated,
the addition of mortgage rates, housing starts, employment, and unem-
ployment to the regression added little explanatory power. However, for
the eight states where income is a less powerful predictor of home prices,
the addition of changes in population, changes in employment, the mort-
gage rate, unemployment, housing starts, and the ratio of income to mort-
gage payment per $1,000 borrowed added signiﬁcantly to the R2 (table 1).
Table 3 reports the pattern of signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for three sets of
regressions on data from the eight states where price-to-income ratios are
1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 308most volatile. Since the equations are in reduced form, the individual
coefﬁcients are plagued by simultaneity. For example, housing starts may
proxy for supply restrictions. That is, where supply is restricted, starts
may be low, pushing up prices. On the other hand, builders clearly
respond to higher prices by building more. Similarly, the change in
employment could have a positive impact on home prices as a proxy for
demand. On the other hand, rising home prices have been shown to have
a negative effect on employment growth in a state by making it difficult
to attract employees to a region with high housing costs.12 In the equa-
tions in which the change in price is the dependent variable (top panel of
the table), the number of housing starts has a positive and significant
coefficient in seven of the eight states. However, in equations in which
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Table 2. Ratio of Home Price to Personal Income per Capita, All States, 1985–2002a
(continued)
Standard 
State Median Trough Peak deviation Mean
Montana 2.55 2.02 2.71 0.22 2.44
Florida 3.04 2.80 3.51 0.21 3.08
Missouri 2.32 1.18 2.71 0.21 2.38
Pennsylvania 2.70 2.43 3.14 0.21 2.73
Wyoming 2.12 1.82 2.65 0.21 2.15
New Mexico 3.38 3.12 3.85 0.20 3.40
Tennessee 2.35 2.23 2.80 0.19 2.43
Nevada 3.56 3.32 3.97 0.18 3.59
Alabama 2.38 2.31 2.84 0.17 2.47
Michigan 1.93 1.69 2.37 0.17 1.98
Minnesota 2.40 2.27 2.92 0.16 2.47
North Carolina 2.60 2.50 2.98 0.16 2.67
Idaho 2.58 2.27 2.91 0.15 2.58
West Virginia 2.32 2.22 2.79 0.15 2.38
South Carolina 2.69 2.57 3.06 0.15 2.74
Kansas 1.97 1.84 2.30 0.14 2.02
South Dakota 1.87 1.73 2.20 0.11 1.89
Nebraska 1.88 1.76 2.12 0.09 1.89
Illinois 2.74 2.57 2.87 0.08 2.73
Wisconsin 2.26 2.12 2.44 0.08 2.25
Kentucky 2.21 2.11 2.41 0.08 2.23
Iowa 1.78 1.68 1.92 0.06 1.79
Indiana 2.12 2.03 2.25 0.06 2.13
Ohio 2.34 2.27 2.46 0.04 2.34
Source: Fiserv CSW Inc., OFHEO, and Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
a. States are listed in descending order according to their standard deviation of home prices.
12. Case (1986).
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Figure 2. Ratio of Home Prices to Personal Income per Capita in Selected States,
1985–2002
























1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 310Table 3. Regressions of Home Prices on Fundamentals in the Most Price-Volatile Statesa
Independent New  Rhode  Massa- New  New 
variableb Hawaii Connecticut Hampshire California Island chusetts Jersey York
Dependent variable: quarterly change in home prices, 1985:1–2002:3
Change in population (percent) + + –
Change in employment (percent) ––
Mortgage rate (percent a year)
Unemployment rate (percent) – ++ +
Housing starts + + + + + + +
Income per capita  + + + + + + +
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.69 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.57 0.72 0.56
Dependent variable: quarterly level of home prices 1985:1–1999:4
Change in population (percent) + – + –– – +
Change in employment (percent) –– – – –
Mortgage rate (percent a year) –
Unemployment rate (percent) + –– – – –
Housing starts + –– – + ––
Income per capita  + + + + +
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.49 0.48 0.82 0.66 0.66 0.82 0.78
Dependent variable: quarterly level of home prices 1985:1–1999:4
One-year change in population (percent) + + – +
One-year change in employment  –– – – – – –
(percent)
Ratio of income per capita to  
annual mortgage payment –
Unemployment rate (percent) –– – –
Income per capita  + + + + + + + +
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.48 0.73 0.86 0.48 0.76 0.73 0.83
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. A plus sign indicates that the coefﬁcient on the variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and a minus sign indicates that it is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.











































1the price level is the dependent variable (middle panel), which are esti-
mated over a shorter time horizon (1985:2 through 1999:4), housing
starts has a significant but negative coefﬁcient in ﬁve of the eight states.
Income has a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient in twenty of the twenty-
four equations presented. The change in employment had a signiﬁcant and
negative effect in fourteen of the twenty-four equations. Unemployment
has a signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient in the price level equations in
ﬁve of the eight states.
Of interest is the fact that the mortgage rate has an insigniﬁcant coefﬁ-
cient in all but one of the regressions presented. This again could be the
result of simultaneity: low rates stimulate the housing market, but low
rates may be caused by Federal Reserve easing in response to a weak
economy and housing market. 
Including the ratio of income to mortgage payment in the regression
allows us to take account of the wide swings in interest rates over this
period. During 2000–02, the combination of low interest rates and high
incomes made housing more affordable. Although this variable had a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant sign in the equations run on all quarters in twenty-one
states, it was signiﬁcant and positive only in New York among the eight
states with a high variance of income to home price. 
To look more closely at the strength of the housing sector since the
stock market crash of 2000–01 and the recession of 2001, we used the
results from the price level equation estimated with 1985:2–1999:4 data,
described above, to forecast the level of home prices for the period from
2000:1 through 2002:3. We did the same exercise with two sets of regres-
sions described in the bottom two panels of table 3.
The results from the middle panel of table 3 are presented in ﬁgure 3.
In all of the eight states except Hawaii, the fundamentals signiﬁcantly
underforecast the actual behavior of home prices since 1999. Diagrams
constructed from the results of the bottom panel of table 3 look exactly
the same.
To conclude this section, we ﬁnd that income alone explains patterns
of home price changes since 1985 in all but eight states. In these states the
addition of other fundamental variables adds explanatory power, but the
pattern of smoothly rising and falling price-to-income ratios and the con-
sistent pattern of underforecasting of home prices during 2000–02 mean
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a bubble exists in these states.
For further evidence we turn to our survey. 
312 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 312Karl E. Case and Robert J. Shiller 313
Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Housing Prices, Selected States, 1985–2003
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In our 1988 paper we presented the results of a survey of a sample of
2,000 households who bought homes in May 1988 in four markets:
Orange County, California (suburban Los Angeles); Alameda County,
California (suburban San Francisco); Middlesex County, Massachusetts
(suburban Boston); and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin.13 The four loca-
tions were chosen to represent hot (California), cooling (Boston), and
steady (Milwaukee) markets. The survey was inspired in part by an article
on page 1 of the June 1, 1988, Wall Street Journal, which described the
current  “frenzy in California’s big single family home market” and
included colorful stories of angst and activity in the housing market
there.14 We wanted to ﬁnd out what was going on in California and com-
pare it with other places in a systematic way. 
The results of that survey provide strong evidence for some parame-
ters of a theory that a housing bubble did exist in 1988: that buyers were
influenced by an investment motive, that they had strong expectations
about future price changes in their housing markets, and that they per-
ceived little risk. Responses to a number of questions revealed that emo-
tion and casual word of mouth played a significant role in home purchase
decisions. In addition, there was no agreement among buyers about the
causes of recent home price movements and no cogent analysis of the
fundamentals. 
One additional ﬁnding in our 1988 paper lends support to an important
stylized fact about the U.S. housing market that has not been well docu-
mented in the literature, namely, that home prices are sticky downward.
That is, when excess supply occurs, prices do not immediately fall to clear
the market. Rather, sellers have reservation prices below which they tend
not to sell. This tendency not to accept price declines is connected with a
belief that prices never do decline, and with some of the parameters of
thinking that underlie a housing bubble. 
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13. Case and Shiller (1988).
14. A. Nomani, Sr., “Nesting Fever: Buyers’ Panic Sweeps California’s Big Market in
One-Family Homes,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1988, p. 1.
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Before we present the results of a virtually identical survey done in
2003, we describe home price behavior in the four survey areas. Although
the timing was not identical, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston
have experienced two boom cycles and a bust in housing prices over the
last twenty years. Table 4 describes the timing and the extent of these
cycles, which are also shown in nominal terms in ﬁgure 4. 
The ﬁrst boom in California was similar in Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco. Prices in both metropolitan areas peaked in the second quarter of
1990 after a 125 percent nominal (55 percent real) run-up, which began
slowly, gradually accelerated into 1988, and then slowed as it approached
the peak. The ﬁrst boom in Boston was also similar, but it accelerated ear-
lier and actually peaked in the third quarter of 1988 after a 143 percent
nominal (more than 100 percent real) increase.
The bust that followed was most severe and longest lived in Los Ange-
les, where prices dropped 29 percent in nominal terms (40 percent in real
terms) from the peak to a trough in the ﬁrst quarter of 1996. Prices in San
Francisco dropped only 14 percent (20 percent real) from the 1990 peak
and began rising again in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993, three years earlier than
in Los Angeles. Boston was on the mend two years earlier than that. 
All three metropolitan areas have seen a prolonged boom ever since,
although San Francisco has shown some volatility since mid-2002. Home
prices during this boom rose 129 percent in nominal terms in San Fran-
cisco, 94 percent in Los Angeles, and 126 percent in Boston, despite very
low overall inﬂation. At the time participants in the second survey sample
were buying their homes, prices were still rising in all four metropolitan
areas. 
The price index for Milwaukee could not be more different. It shows a
very steady climb at a rate of 5.6 percent annually, essentially the same
rate of growth as income per capita. Interestingly, over the entire cycle,
Milwaukee did about as well as Los Angeles, but not as well as Boston or
San Francisco. Home prices in Boston increased more than ﬁvefold in
nominal terms over the cycle, while prices in San Francisco quadrupled
and prices in both Milwaukee and Los Angeles tripled.
Three of the four metropolitan areas—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Boston—show pronounced cycles. These three might be called glamour
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entertainment industry, or world-class universities, or high-technology
industries, and the prices of homes in these metropolitan areas are high as
well as volatile.15
Table 5 looks at the latest boom cycle in a bit more detail. Using the
state data described in the earlier section, the table makes two points.
First, in all three states, home price increases outpaced income growth.
(Note that the price increases are not as great as in the metropolitan area
data because the indexes are for the entire state.) All three states had
increases in their ratios of home price to annual income, but the changes
were dramatically larger in the boom-and-bust states. 
After peaking at nearly 10 percent in early 1995, the thirty-year ﬁxed
rate dropped below 7 percent by mid-1999. During 2000 rates spiked back
to 8.5 percent but then fell steadily from mid-2000 until 2003, when they
brieﬂy went below 5 percent. 
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15. Differences in glamour across cities is a sensitive topic, but one that is nonetheless
very real and ought to be taken note of here. Some of our respondents were very opinion-
ated about these differences. One Milwaukee respondent wrote on the questionnaire: “I was
laid off and forced to expand my job search nationwide. I did not want to leave Chicago and
certainly did not want to relocate to Milwaukee, a second rate city with high unemploy-
ment. . . . However, the upside is that the housing prices in Chicago are so much higher than
Milwaukee County and I was able to sell my tiny Cape Cod for a beautiful 4 bedroom his-
toric house on a prime residential street.” 
Table 4. Change in Average Home Price in Survey Cities during 
Boom and Bust, 1982–2003a
Percent
Period Los Angeles San Francisco Boston Milwaukee
1982-peak +128 +126 +143 …b
Peak quarter 1990:2 1990:2 1988:3
Peak to trough –29 –14 –16 …
Trough quarter 1996:1 1993:1 1991:1
Trough to peak +94 +129 +126 …
Peak quarter 2003:1 2002:3 2003:1
Whole period +214 +325 +419 +213
At annual rate 5.6 7.1 8.2 5.6
Source: Fiserv CSW Inc. repeat-sales indexes.
a. Data cover the period 1982:1–2003:1.
b. Home prices displayed no clear peak or trough during the period.
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Figure 4. Case-Shiller Home Price Index, Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1982–2003a
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costs of buying a home. In 1995, at the beginning of the current run-up,
the thirty-year ﬁxed rate was 8.8 percent. It had fallen to 6 percent at the
time the sample was drawn, keeping the monthly payment required to buy
the median home from rising faster than income. The ratio of annual pay-
ment to income per capita actually fell in California and Wisconsin and
stayed constant in Massachusetts. This fact adds weight to the argument
that fundamental factors have an important effect on current home prices. 
Survey Method
A random sample of 500 home sales was drawn from each of the same
four counties as in our 1988 survey, and so we can make comparisons
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Table 5. Home Prices, Personal Income, and Mortgage Payments, Selected States,
1995 and 2002
Current dollars except where stated otherwise
Measure California Massachusetts Wisconsin
Home prices
1995:1 158,954 121,091 50,557
2002:3 276,695 231,994 73,071
Total change (percent) +74 +92 +45
At annual rate (percent) 7.7 9.1 5.1
Personal income per capita
1995:1 24,044 27,224 22,203
2002:3 33,362 39,605 30,138
Total change (percent) +39 +45 +35
At annual rate (percent) 4.5 5.1 4.1
Ratio of home price to income per capita
1995:1 6.61 4.45 2.28
2002:3 8.29 5.86 2.42
Annual mortgage paymenta
1995:1 12,145 9,253 3,862
2002:3 15,908 13,338 4,201
Ratio of mortgage payment to income per capita
1995:1 0.51 0.34 0.17
2002:3 0.47 0.34 0.14
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Economy.com, Fannie Mae, U.S. Bureau of the Census data adjusted using CSW or
blended repeat-sales indexes.
a. Assumes thirty-year ﬁxed rate mortgage at 80 percent loan to value at annual interest rate of 8.8 percent (February 1995) or
6.0 percent (August 2002).
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our 1988 survey, adding only several new questions at the end so that
there was no change in the context of any questions. The accompanying
letters were essentially similar to those of 1988. 
Survey methods followed guidelines outlined elsewhere.16 Ordinary
mail was used because we judged that the use of e-mail was still not wide-
spread enough to produce a representative sample. The questionnaire was
ten pages long and included questions on a number of topics. The focus
was on the homebuyers’ expectations, understandings of the market situ-
ation, and behavior. The questionnaire encouraged respondents to “write
comments anywhere on the questionnaire,” and their comments were
indeed helpful to us in interpreting the signiﬁcance of the answers.
During the ﬁrst survey, in 1988, two of the four markets were booming
(the California counties), one market was at its peak and showing excess
supply (Boston), and one was drifting (Milwaukee). This time three of the
four markets were in remarkable booms, and Milwaukee again served as a
control city, where no real boom was taking place. 
The survey was sent to 2,000 persons who had bought homes between
March and August 2002. These dates fall just before the peak in media
usage of the term “housing bubble” in October 2002. Questionnaires with
personalized letters to the respondents were mailed in January 2003, a
reminder postcard was sent in February, and replacement questionnaires
with personalized letters were again sent to those who had not responded
in March. These dates were just after the peak in media use of the term
“housing bubble.” Thus we managed to get our questionnaire survey out
at a time when attention to the possibility of a housing bubble must have
been close to its maximum. Our respondents had the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the real estate market at a time of intense public attention to the
possibility of a bubble and had the opportunity to read and think about
this experience for some months afterward. This is what we wanted to do,
since our purpose is to gauge human behavior during a purported bubble.
Just under 700 questionnaires were returned completed and usable in
the 2003 survey, for a somewhat lower response rate than in the 1988 sur-
vey. Response rates for each county are given in table 6.
At the time of the 2003 survey, the economy was recovering from the
recession that had ended in November 2001, but the recovery was slow,
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16. Dillman (1978).
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that the recession was over. In contrast, at the time of our 1988 survey,
there had been no recession for several years. In addition, the Federal
Reserve had reduced interest rates to historic lows at the time the buyers
in our 2003 survey were signing purchase and sale agreements. In 1988,
in contrast, interest rates were on the rise.
Table 7 describes the sample. A substantial majority of buyers were
buying as a primary residence, and only a small minority were buying to
rent. First-time buyers were a majority of the sample in Milwaukee. The
lowest percentage of ﬁrst-time buyers was in Los Angeles. We were sur-
prised to see that, in the 2003 survey, more than 90 percent of the homes
purchased in all four markets were single-family homes, a much larger
share than in the 1988 survey. We have no explanation as yet for this.
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Table 6. Survey Sample Sizes and Response Rates in 1988 and 2003
Returns Response  rate 
Sample size tabulated (percent)
Metropolitan area  1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Los Angeles 500 500 241 143 48.2 28.6
San Francisco  530 500 199 164 37.5 32.8
Boston 500 500 200 203 40.0 40.6
Milwaukee 500 500 246 187 49.2 37.4
Total 2,030 2,000 886 697 43.9 34.9
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
Table 7. Characteristics of Respondents’ Home Purchases
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Description 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Single-family home 70.0 95.2 55.9 96.4 39.7 97.5 71.1 91.6
First-time purchase 35.8 31.7 36.2 46.0 51.5 41.6 56.9 53.1
Bought as primary  88.4 95.6 72.7 93.3 92.0 97.1 88.2 90.0
residence
Bought to rent to others 3.7 2.8 12.1 3.0 3.0 0.9 4.1 5.3
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
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The results of the 2003 survey, presented in tables 8 through 14, shed
light on a number of aspects of homebuying behavior—including invest-
ment motivations and the expectation of further price rises, the amount of
local excitement and discussion about real estate, the sense of urgency in
buying a home, adherence to simplistic theories about housing markets,
the occurrence of sales above asking prices, and perceptions of risk—that
suggest the presence or absence of a bubble in home prices.
Housing as an Investment
A tendency to view housing as an investment is a deﬁning characteris-
tic of a housing bubble. Expectations of future appreciation of the home
are a motive for buying that deﬂects consideration from how much one is
paying for housing services. That is what a bubble is all about: buying for
the future price increases rather than simply for the pleasure of occupying
the home. And it is this motive that is thought to lend instability to bub-
bles, a tendency to crash when the investment motive weakens.
Table 8 presents the responses to questions about housing as an invest-
ment. For the vast majority of buyers, either investment was “a major
consideration” or they at least “in part” thought of their purchase as an
investment. In Milwaukee and San Francisco investment was a major
consideration for a majority of buyers. This tendency to view housing as
an investment is similar to what it was in the boom period that we
observed in our 1988 survey, although somewhat weaker. Far fewer of the
homebuyers in 2003 said that they were buying “strictly for investment
purposes.” Thus conditions reported in 2003 would appear to be consis-
tent with a bubble story, although less so than they were in 1988.
The apparent attractiveness of housing as an investment is further
enhanced if the buyer perceives that the investment entails only very little
risk. As table 8 also shows, in all cities in both 1988 and 2003, only a
small percentage of buyers thought that housing involved a great deal of
risk, although the fraction seeing a great deal of risk rose (perhaps not sur-
prisingly) to a fairly high level (14.8 percent) in San Francisco in 2003. In
three of the four cities (Milwaukee being the exception), there was more
perception of risk in 2003 than there had been in 1988, which is what one
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the perception of risk of price decline is small: one may say that home-
buyers did not perceive themselves to be in a bubble.
Exaggerated Expectations, Excitement, and Word of Mouth
Table 9 gets to the meat of the housing bubble issue: the role of price
expectations, the emotional charge, and the extent of talk about real
estate. Expectations about the future price performance of homes were
high in both 1988 and 2003. In both of these housing booms, roughly
90 percent or more of respondents expected an increase in home prices
over the next several years, and the average expected increase over the
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Table 8. Survey Responses on Housing as an Investment, 
1988 and 2003
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
In deciding to buy your property, did you think 
of the purchase as an investment?
It was a major  56.3 46.8 63.8 51.8 48.0 33.9 44.0 50.3
consideration
In part 40.3 46.2 31.7 34.4 45.0 56.2 45.7 42.2
Not at all 4.2 7.0 4.5 9.8 7.0 9.9 10.3 7.5
No. of responses 238 143 199 164 200 203 243 187
Why did you buy the 
home that you did?
Strictly for investment  19.8 7.5 37.2 10.6 15.6 8.2 18.7 13.8
purposes
No. of responses 238 142 199 164 199 203 246 187
Buying a home in [city] 
today involves
A great deal of risk 3.4 7.9 4.2 14.8 5.1 7.8 5.9 4.3
Some risk 33.3 47.5 40.1 51.9 57.9 62.5 64.6 57.3
Little or no risk 63.3 44.6 55.7 33.3 37.1 29.6 29.5 38.4
No. of responses 237 143 192 164 197 203 237 187
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
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Table 9. Survey Responses on Price Expectations, Sense of Excitement, and Talk,
1988 and 2003
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Do you think that housing prices in the [city] area 
will increase or decrease over the next several years?
Increase 98.3 89.7 99.0 90.5 90.2 83.1 87.1 95.2
Decrease 1.7 10.3 1.0 9.5 9.8 16.9 12.9 4.8
No. of responses 240 145 199 158 194 201 233 187
How much of a change do you expect there to be in 
the value of your home over the next 12 months?
Mean response  15.3 10.5 13.5 9.8 7.4 7.2 6.1 8.9
(percent)
Standard error 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.0
No. of responses 217 139 185 147 176 179 217 160
On average over the next 10 years, how much do you expect
the value of your property to change each year?
Mean response  14.3 13.1 14.8 15.7 8.7 14.6 7.3 11.7
(percent)
Standard error 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.8 0.6 1.8 0.5 1.3
No. of responses 208 137 181 152 177 186 211 169
Which of the following best describes the trend 
in home prices in the [city] area since January 1988?
Rising rapidly 90.8 76.2 83.7 28.6 3.0 29.6 8.7 33.0
Rising slowly 8.8 22.4 12.8 51.0 34.3 49.2 53.0 57.3
Not changing 0.4 1.4 3.1 14.3 37.4 12.6 23.9 8.6
Falling slowly 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.2 22.2 8.5 11.7 1.1
Falling rapidly 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.6 0.0
No. of responses 239 143 196 161 198 199 230 185
It’s a good time to buy because housing prices 
are likely to rise in the future.
Agree 93.2 77.0 95.0 82.1 77.8 66.1 84.8 87.0
Disagree 6.8 23.0 5.0 17.9 22.2 33.9 15.2 13.0
No. of responses 206 126 180 145 171 174 210 161
Housing prices are booming. Unless I buy 
now, I won’t be able to afford a home later.
Agree 79.5 48.8 68.9 59.7 40.8 37.1 27.8 36.4
Disagree 20.5 51.2 31.1 40.3 59.2 62.9 72.2 63.6
No. of responses 200 124 167 134 169 175 194 154
(continued)
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Francisco in 2003.17
But it is the long-term (ten-year) expectations that are most striking.
When asked what they thought would be the average rate of increase per
year over the next ten years, respondents in Los Angeles gave an average
reply of 13.1 percent (versus 14.3 percent in 1988); in San Francisco they
were even more optimistic, at 15.7 percent (14.8 percent in 1988); in
Boston the answer was 14.6 percent (8.7 percent in 1988); and in Mil-
waukee it was 11.7 percent (7.3 percent in 1988). Note that even a rate of
increase of only 11.7 percent a year means a tripling of value in ten years.
Thus, although the one-year expectations in the glamour cities were lower
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17. In 2003 the median expected twelve-month price increases were 10 percent for Los
Angeles, 7 percent for San Francisco, 5 percent for Boston, and 5 percent for Milwaukee.
The lower values for the medians than for the corresponding means reﬂect the fact that the
high expectations for future price increase were especially concentrated among a relatively
few respondents.”
Table 9. Survey Responses on Price Expectations, Sense of Excitement, and Talk,
1988 and 2003 (continued)
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
There has been a good deal of excitement surrounding 
recent housing price changes. I sometimes think that I may have 
been inﬂuenced by it.
Yes 54.3 46.1 56.5 38.5 45.3 29.6 21.5 34.8
No 45.7 53.9 43.5 61.5 54.7 70.4 78.5 65.2
No. of responses 230 141 191 156 181 199 233 184
In conversations with friends and associates over the last 
few months, conditions in the housing market were discussed…
Frequently 52.9 32.9 49.7 37.4 30.3 31.0 20.0 27.6
Sometimes 38.2 50.3 39.0 43.6 55.1 53.7 50.2 40.5
Seldom 8.0 14.7 9.7 17.2 12.1 14.3 25.1 28.1
Never 0.8 2.1 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.0 4.7 3.8
No. of responses 238 143 195 163 198 203 235 185
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
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higher.18
Fewer respondents in 2003 said that it was a good time to buy a home
because prices may be rising in the future, but at least two-thirds agreed
with the statement in all four cities. Many thought not only that now was
a good time to buy, but also that there was a risk that delay might mean
not being able to afford a home later.
The number who admitted to being inﬂuenced by “excitement” about
home prices was still high, close to 50 percent in Los Angeles, but lower
than in 1988. The amount of talk was nearly as high as in 1988, and talk is
an important indicator of a bubble, since word-of-mouth transmission of
the excitement is a hallmark. 
We conclude that these general indicators of the deﬁning characteris-
tics of bubbles were fairly strong in 2003. However, they were generally
less strong than in 1988 in the glamour cities and stronger than in 1988 in
Milwaukee.
Simple (or Simplistic) Theories
Table 10 shows results on respondents’ agreement with a number of
simple, popular theories or stories about speculative price movements that
might inﬂuence how their interpretation of recent events translated into
bubble expectations. Our survey results indicate that these simplistic the-
ories are quite a powerful force and, moreover, a bit different in the glam-
our or bubble cities of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston than in
cities generally thought less exciting, like Milwaukee. 
The most simplistic theory is one that we have often heard expressed in
casual conversation: that desirable real estate just naturally appreciates
rapidly. The theory expressed seems to confuse the level of prices with
the rate of change. The most elementary economic theory would say that
properties that people ﬁnd most attractive will be highly priced, but not
necessarily increasing more rapidly in price than other properties. We
tried to gauge agreement with this theory by asking whether people
agreed with the statement “Housing prices have boomed in [city] because
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18. The median ten-year expectations were 8 percent in Los Angeles, 7 percent in San
Francisco, 5 percent in Boston, and 5 percent in Milwaukee; once again the medians show
less strikingly high expectations.
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Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
Los Angeles San Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Housing prices have boomed in [city] because lots of people want to live here.
Agree 98.6 93.8 93.3 89.1 69.6 77.8 16.1 23.0
Disagree 1.4 6.2 6.7 10.9 30.4 22.2 83.9 77.0
No. of responses 210 128 178 147 181 176 193 148
The real problem in [city] is that there is just not enough land available.
Agree 52.8 60.3 83.9 59.6 54.2 72.9 17.2 35.4
Disagree 47.2 39.7 16.1 40.4 45.8 27.1 82.8 64.6
No. of responses 197 121 174 141 168 177 192 158
When there is simply not enough housing available, price becomes unimportant.
Agree 34.0 31.9 40.6 32.6 26.9 32 20.7 25.2
Disagree 66.0 68.1 59.4 67.4 73.1 68 79.3 74.8
No. of responses 197 116 165 141 171 172 193 151
In a hot real estate market, sellers often get more than one offer on the day they list the property. 
Some are even over the asking price. There are also stories about people waiting in line to make 
offers. Which is the best explanation?
There is panic buying and price becomes irrelevant.  73.3 63.7 71.2 73.9 61.4 73.1 34.6 46.8
Asking prices have adjusted slowly or sluggishly to increasing 
demand. 26.7 36.2 28.8 26.1 38.6 39.9 65.4 53.2
No. of responses 210 135 177 153 176 197 211 173
Which of the following better describes your theory about recent trends in home prices in [city]?
It is a theory about the psychology of homebuyers and sellers. 11.9 10.8 16.7 15.0 21.3 11.8 10.7 13.7
It is a theory about economic or demographic conditions such as
population changes, changes in interest rates, or employment. 88.1 89.2 83.3 85.0 78.7 88.2 89.3 86.3
No. of responses 226 130 180 153 188 195 215 168











































6lots of people want to live here.” There was overwhelming agreement
with this statement in all the glamour cities, but not in Milwaukee. 
An even more outrageous fallacy that we detect in popular conversa-
tion about home prices is that “When there is simply not enough housing
available, price becomes unimportant.” To our respondents’ credit, most
did not agree with this statement. But from 20 to 40 percent did agree,
particularly in the glamour cities.
Another fallacy we think we have detected is in the interpretation of
prices closing above asking prices. Homeowners sometimes seem to think
that this phenomenon is a sign of a crazy boom that suspends the eco-
nomic laws of supply and demand. Indeed, most homebuyers in the glam-
our cities thought that at such a time “there is panic buying and price
becomes irrelevant.”
These results do not firmly prove that people are guilty of economic
fallacies, because the questions admit of alternative interpretations, and
people were probably not focusing clearly on their exact wording. How-
ever, we do believe that the strong agreement with some of these state-
ments is at least suggestive of such fallacies. We believe that there is a
sort of knee-jerk reaction to stories about boom markets in real estate
that does not accord with economic theory, but that does affect the prices
people are willing to pay for their homes. We leave clearer proof that
people adhere to such fallacies to further work. A closer study of such
popular fallacies is difficult to carry out, for if we draw out the fallacy
clearly enough to reveal their belief in it to our satisfaction, respondents
may be educated out of the fallacy by the very questioning intended to
reveal it. 
All these theories about panic buying and the irrelevance of price do
not, however, indicate that people generally believe that markets are
driven by psychology. The results of the last question in table 10 show
that people generally do not believe that markets are driven primarily by
psychology, even in a booming real estate market. We interpret this as
further conﬁrming our general conclusion that most homeowners do not
perceive themselves to be in a bubble even at the height of a bubble.
Popular Themes in Interpreting Recent Price Movements 
We have documented that people talked a lot about the housing market
both in 1988 and in 2003. What is it that they are likely to have talked
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to understand the origins of the purported housing bubble.
Table 11 shows some results from two open-ended questions that were
put on the questionnaire, along with a space for the respondent to write in
answers in his or her own words. Responses to these questions are espe-
cially interesting because they elicit themes that are already on the minds
of respondents, rather than putting words in their mouths. 
One would perhaps not expect any one theme to dominate in answers
to such questions, since people are so different and such broad questions
allow so many different interpretations. But we do see what appears to be
a dominating theme both in 1988 and in 2003, namely, interest rates.
Clearly, interest rates have fallen substantially and have contributed to the
run-up in prices since 1995, at least in the cities where, in our regressions,
the interest rate variable was signiﬁcant. Although, according to basic
economic theory, interest rates should be more important in regions
where the elasticity of supply of housing is relatively low or the likely
growth of future demand relatively high, there is little evidence of this
effect in state-by-state regressions.
Many of the answers to these questions are disappointing. Typically
the answers read like random draws from the business section of the
newspaper, or else the respondents refer to casual observations that one
might make just driving around town. Respondents presented no quantita-
tive evidence and made no reference to professional forecasts. One should
not be surprised at this, however. After all, the single-family home market
is a market of amateurs, generally with no economic training.
Once more we see evidence that in neither period did many homebuy-
ers perceive themselves to be in a housing bubble. References to market
psychology were quite rare. 
Relation of Investment Demand in 2003 to the 
Stock Market Boom and Bust 
The appearance of the real estate bubble right after the stock market
drop has lent support to the notion that the two are somehow connected.
One popular theory is that the stock market drop was followed by
investor disgust with the stock market and a “flight to quality,” as people
sought safer investments in real assets like homes. There has been a lot
of discussion about people shifting their assets toward housing because
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Table 11. Survey Responses: Popular Themes Mentioned in Interpreting Recent
Housing Price Changes, 1988 and 2003
Percent of responsesa
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
National factors
Interest rate changes 32 33 40 10 25 20 27 39
Stock market crash 2 4 2 11 25 13 2 8
September 11, 2001 6 9 16 7
Iraq war 2003 2 4 2 3
Dot-com bust 2 21 4 0
Corporate scandals,  0 1 0 0
loss of conﬁdence
Poor or slow economy 5 24 34 15
Regional factors
Region is a good place  17 13 18 8 6 5 2 3
to live
Immigration or  20 8 8 7 11 5 2 8
population change
Asian investors 3 0 27 0 0 0 0 0
Asian immigrants 2 0 14 0 1 0 0 0
Income growth 3 1 2 4 2 2 1 2
Anti-growth legislation 11 0 3 0 0 1 0 0
Not enough land 8 5 19 2 2 3 0 0
Local taxes 3 0 0 0 4 0 10 4
Increasing black  0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
population
Rental rates and vacancies 0 1 3 0 7 3 2 0
Trafﬁc congestion 4 0 7 1 0 0 0 0
Local economy—general 25 3 5 6 30 6 18 5
Other




Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Percent of questionnaires that mentioned, in answer to either of two open-ended questions, the general subject indicated as
determined by the authors’ reading of their text answers. The questions were the following: “What do you think explains recent
changes in home prices in [city]? What ultimately is behind what’s going on?” and “Was there any event (or events) in the last
two years that you think changed the trend in home prices?”
b. Any reference to panic, frenzy, greed, apathy, foolishness, excessive optimism, excessive pessimism, or other such factors
was coded in this category.
c. The coder was asked to look for any reference at all to any numbers relevant to future supply or demand for housing or to
any professional forecast of supply or demand. The numbers need not have been presented, so long as the respondent seemed to
be referring to such numbers.
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a falling stock market could have a negative wealth effect on home buy-
ing decisions.19
Table 12 presents the responses to three questions that we did not ask
in 1988 but were added at the end of the questionnaire in 2003. Recall that
the survey was virtually ﬁnished before the stock market rally (25 percent
on the S&P500) of March 11–July 8, 2003, and that the respondents had
purchased their homes several months before. 
The answers to the last question in table 12, about whether the experi-
ence with the stock market encouraged purchase of a home, show that for
the vast majority of people in all four counties the performance of the
stock market “had no effect on my decision to buy my house.” However,
one should not discard the notion that the stock market’s behavior was at
least partly responsible for the boom in the real estate market. Judging
from their additional comments, it appears that some of the majority who
said the stock market had no effect on the decision to buy a home said so
only because they would have bought some home in any event, even if
perhaps a smaller home. More signiﬁcantly, many other respondents
(roughly between a quarter and a third) said that the stock market’s per-
formance “encouraged” them to buy a home, whereas only a small per-
centage found it discouraging.
Immediately after this question we included an open-ended question,
“Please explain your thinking here,” followed by an open space. Although
most left this space blank, the answers we did get were all over the map,
as respondents apparently viewed the question as an opportunity to vent
on any subject. 
Some of the answers from those who said they were encouraged by the
stock market did refer to the drop in the stock market after 2000 as a rea-
son to buy a home now. Quoting a few of their answers verbatim will
illustrate: “Housing costs continue to increase. Value of home investment
to increase. Stock market not so promising.” “Could be better investment
than stock market.” “I lost $400,000 in my pension and personal stock
portfolio—at least buying this big beautiful home I know it’s a hard asset
that would hold its value & appreciate while it gives me great enjoyment.”
“Money that we had saved for a house was starting to become a loss in the
market.” “I have only made money in real estate and lost a lot in the stock
330 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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1790-04_Case.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 330market.” “The stock market at my age is not helping me. Short-term real
estate is the strongest investment you can make short or long term.”
“Stock market went down. House market is still going up.” “Renting is
not cheap, stock is declining, this implies our total assets is [sic] not going
anywhere.” “The value of my condo had increased signiﬁcantly compared
to the gains to my portfolio. With interest rates low a new home seemed
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Table 12. Survey Responses on Real Estate versus Stock Market Investment, 2003
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Question Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Do you agree with the following statement: 
“Real estate is the best investment for long-term holders, 
who can just buy and hold through the ups and downs 
of the market”?
Strongly agree 53.7 50.6 36.7 31.3
Somewhat agree 33.1 39.5 48.5 45.9
Neutral 10.3 6.7 9.3 11.3
Somewhat disagree 2.7 2.4 4.9 9.1
Strongly disagree 0.0 0.6 0.4 2.1
No. of responses 145 162 204 185
Do you agree with the following statement: “The stock 
market is the best investment for long-term holders, 
who can just buy and hold through the ups and 
downs of the market”?
Strongly agree 8.2 8.0 14.7 14.9
Somewhat agree 32.4 38.2 44.3 33.6
Neutral 32.4 27.7 17.7 25.6
Somewhat disagree 20.0 16.0 15.2 20.3
Strongly disagree 6.8 9.8 7.8 5.3
No. of responses 145 162 203 187
The experience with the stock market 
in the past few years…
Much encouraged me to buy my  13.9 15.5 14.3 9.1
house
Somewhat encouraged me to buy  11.1 16.7 13.8 13.9
my house
Had no effect on my decision to  74.1 64.5 70.7 74.7
buy my house
Somewhat discouraged me from  0.0 2.4 0.9 2.1
buying my house
Much discouraged me from buying  0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
my house
No. of responses 143 161 202 186
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
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and brings tax & quality of life beneﬁts.”
Some respondents referred to the increased volatility or other uncer-
tainty in the stock market since 2000, rather than its changed level, as a
reason to shift their portfolio: “It seemed that shifting some of our net
worth to cash and homeownership was a wise move in the face of the mar-
ket volatility in 2000–2002.” “I’m buying the house for the long term.
The house will probably depreciate in the next couple years, but it will
certainly appreciate over 10+ years. This is because it is a good house in a
good community. This is information that I am conﬁdent of. In contrast,
there is no conﬁdence that I have full (or even good) information about
the stock market (or that even my mutual fund managers have good infor-
mation about the companies they invest in). So, I buy the house.” “A
house seems like a more solid investment than stocks. Less volatile.”
Although this evidence is far from proof of a connection between the
stock market and the housing market, we interpret it as conﬁrming the
notion that people got fed up with the stock market after the decline and
high volatility following the 2000 peak and became more positive about
real estate. 
Excess Demand and Upward Rigidity in Asking Prices
In the boom cities, newspaper articles feature stories of homes that sold
well above the asking price. We have already noted that it was an article
in the Wall Street Journal referring to “frenzy in California’s big single
family home market” that inspired our original survey. In fact, such
frenzy seems to be a fairly common occurrence in boom cities. As
table 13 shows, quite a large number of people reported selling above the
asking price in both the 1988 and 2003 surveys. An amazing 45 percent of
respondents in San Francisco in the 2003 survey reported selling at above
the asking price in 2002, well after the sharp decline in employment fol-
lowing the NASDAQ collapse, which began in 2000. Sellers in Los
Angeles reported that about 20 percent of properties sold for more than
the asking price, as did a slightly smaller share in Milwaukee, which had
no boom. 
Many of those who sold felt that if they had charged 5 or 10 percent
more, the property would have sold just as quickly. This was the sense of
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Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Did you ﬁnally settle on the price that was…
Above the asking price? 6.3 19.9 9.8 45.8 0.5 21.3 3.3 17.5
Equal to the asking price? 38.0 50.4 26.8 27.5 23.5 59.1 22.7 52.4
Below the asking price? 55.7 29.7 63.4 26.7 76.0 28.6 74.0 31.1
No. of responses 237 141 194 153 200 203 242 183
If you had asked 5 to 10 percent more for your property, what would the 
likely outcome have been?a
It wouldn’t have been sold. 21.3 23.5 23.4 27.1 31.1 27.7 32.5 26.1
It would have sold but it would have taken much more time. 44.9 47.1 46.9 40.7 54.1 38.6 37.2 39.3
If buyers had to pay that much they might not be able to obtain ﬁnancing 
(a buyer cannot obtain ﬁnancing unless an appraiser conﬁrms the 
worth of the property). 7.9 4.1 9.4 6.8 0.0 4.8 9.3 8.7
It probably would have sold almost as quickly. 24.7 23.5 17.2 20.3 11.5 26.5 16.3 21.7
Other 1.1 1.5 3.1 5.1 3.3 2.4 4.7 4.4












































3Table 13. Survey Responses on Excess Demand and Upward Rigidity in Asking Prices, 1988 and 2003a (continued)
Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
If you answered that it would have sold almost as quickly, which of the 
following (you can check more than one) explains why you didn’t set 
the price higher?a
The property simply wasn’t worth that much. 32.4 25.8 27.3 23.1 38.5 13.5 25.0 13.3
It wouldn’t have been fair to set it that high; given what I paid for it, 
I was already getting enough for it. 16.2 25.8 22.7 61.5 15.4 54.1 31.3 46.7
I simply made a mistake or got bad advice; I should have asked for more. 21.6 19.4 18.2 7.7 19.2 8.1 25.0 13.3
Other 29.7 29.0 31.8 7.7 26.9 24.3 18.8 26.7
No. of responses 37 31 22 26 26 37 16 15
In the six months prior to the time you ﬁrst listed the property, did you 
receive any unsolicited calls from a real estate agent or anyone else 
about the possibility of selling your house?a
Yes 71.9 69.1 59.0 55.6 38.7 53.0 43.2 . . .b
No 28.1 30.9 41.0 44.4 61.3 46.0 56.8 . . .
Approximate number of calls
Mean 8.7 5.0 3.9 2.7
Standard error 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.2
No. of responses 89 68 61 63 62 83 48 44
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.
a. Responses from buyers surveyed who had also sold a home. The sale is assumed to have occurred in the same metropolitan area as the purchase. 











































4over 20 percent of sellers in all markets in 2003, a substantially larger
fraction than in 1998 except in Los Angeles, where it stayed the same.
An amazing number of the 2003 respondents—in fact, a majority in
San Francisco and Boston, a near majority in Milwaukee, and 26 percent
in Los Angeles—thought that charging more than they did would be
unfair. On the other hand, the number who reported that their home was
not intrinsically worth more than they were asking dropped in the latest
survey compared with that in 1988.
Downward Rigidity and Excess Supply
An important question on which the survey sheds some light is, What
happens in a bust? How do sellers respond to rising inventories and
increasing time on the market? It is important ﬁrst to point out that the
housing market is not an auction market. Prices do not fall to clear the
market quickly, as one observes in most asset markets. Selling a home
requires agreement between buyer and seller. It is a stylized fact about the
housing market that bid-ask spreads widen when demand drops, and the
number of transactions falls sharply. This must mean that sellers resist
cutting prices.
Table 14 supports the notion that sellers lower their asking prices only
as a last resort. A majority of respondents in all cities and in both years of
the survey argue that the best strategy in a slow market is to “hold up until
you get what you want.” Only a small minority reported that they would
have “lowered the price until I found a buyer.” In addition, large majori-
ties ranging from 79 percent in San Francisco in 1988 to 93 percent in
post-boom Boston reported having reservation prices.
There is clear evidence that such resistance prevents home prices from
falling at the onset of a down period and that, if the underlying fundamen-
tals come back quickly enough, they can prevent a bubble from bursting.
Instead, the danger when demand drops in housing markets is that the vol-
ume of sales may drop precipitously. This could do more damage to the
U.S. economy today than a modest decline in prices.
A Model of Speculative Bubbles in Housing
Buyers and sellers in the housing market are overwhelmingly ama-
teurs, who have little experience with trading. High transactions costs,
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Percent of responses except where stated otherwise
San
Los Angeles Francisco Boston Milwaukee
Question 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Since housing prices are unlikely to drop very much, the best strategy in a 
slow market is to hold up until you get what you want for a property.
Agree 69.0 64.0 69.6 69.0 57.5 51.2 50.6 61.9
Disagree 31.0 36.0 30.4 31.0 42.5 48.8 49.4 38.1
No. of responses 174 111 148 129 160 166 180 147
If you had not been able to sell your property for the price that you 
received, what would you have done?a
Left the price the same and waited for a buyer, knowing full well that it  42.0 32.3 38.7 29.5 32.8 21.7 32.6 39.5
might have taken a long time
Lowered the price step by step hoping to ﬁnd a buyer 20.5 32.3 38.7 26.7 42.6 47.0 20.9 30.2
Lowered the price till I found a buyer 4.5 7.7 3.2 11.5 4.9 12.0 7.0 9.3
Taken the house off the market 18.2 21.5 17.7 27.9 11.5 15.7 27.9 16.3
Other 14.8 6.2 1.6 4.9 8.2 3.6 11.6 4.6
No. of responses 88 65 62 61 61 83 43 43
If you answered that you would have lowered your price, is there a limit 
to how far you would have gone if the property still hadn’t sold?a
Yes 81.8 85.7 78.9 81.3 93.1 87.7 87.5 90.3
No. of responses 33 35 38 32 29 57 16 32
Source: Authors’ survey described in the text.











































6moral hazard problems, and government subsidization of owner-occupied
homes have kept professional speculators out of the market. These ama-
teurs are highly involved with the market at the time of home purchase
and may overreact at times to price changes and to simple stories, result-
ing in substantial momentum in housing prices. 
Shiller argues that speculative bubbles are caused by “precipitating
factors” that change public opinion about markets or that have an imme-
diate impact on demand, and by “ampliﬁcation mechanisms” that take the
form of price-to-price feedback.20 A number of fundamental factors can
inﬂuence price movements in housing markets. On the demand side,
demographics, income growth, employment growth, changes in ﬁnancing
mechanisms or interest rates, as well as changes in locational characteris-
tics such as accessibility, schools, or crime, to name a few, have been
shown to have effects. On the supply side, attention has been paid to con-
struction costs, the age of the housing stock, and the industrial organiza-
tion of the housing market. The elasticity of supply has been shown to be
a key factor in the cyclical behavior of home prices. 
The cyclical process that we observed in the 1980s in those cities expe-
riencing boom-and-bust cycles was that general economic expansion, best
proxied by employment gains, drove demand up. In the short run those
increases in demand encountered an inelastic supply of housing and
developable land, inventories of for-sale properties shrank, and vacancy
declined. As a consequence, prices accelerated. This provided the ampli-
ﬁcation mechanism as it led buyers to anticipate further gains, and the
bubble was born. Once prices overshoot or supply catches up, inventories
begin to rise, time on the market increases, vacancy rises, and price
increases slow, eventually encountering downward stickiness. 
With housing, a signiﬁcant precipitating factor may be employment
gains, if only because they are highly visible. Employment releases occur
on the ﬁrst Friday of each month, with state data released somewhat later.
Both national and state releases by the BLS receive dramatic fanfare in
the press. In all three of the cities with volatile prices, substantial employ-
ment gains and falling unemployment preceded the upward acceleration
of home prices during both booms. 
The predominant story about home prices is always the prices them-
selves; the feedback from initial price increases to further price increases
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prices are going up rapidly, there is much word-of-mouth communication,
a hallmark of a bubble. The word of mouth can spread optimistic stories
and thus help cause an overreaction to other stories, such as stories about
employment. The ampliﬁcation can also work on the downside as well.
Price decreases will generate publicity for negative stories about the city,
but downward stickiness is encountered initially.
The ampliﬁcation mechanism appears to be stronger in the glamour
cities that were undergoing rapid price change at the time of our surveys
than in our control city of Milwaukee. We saw in our survey results that
talk about real estate is more frequent in those cities and that excitement is
stronger there. Presumably this greater talk and excitement have some-
thing to do with the greater price volatility seen historically in the glamour
cities, leading to greater public interest and concern with movements in
real estate prices. Thus real estate price volatility can be self-perpetuating:
once started, it generates more public attention and interest, and thus more
volatility in the future. 
Longer-run forces that come into play tend eventually to reverse the
impact of any initial price increases and the public overreaction to them.
New construction can bring some new housing online in the space of
about a year. The United States now has a highly sophisticated national
construction industry, dominated by national ﬁrms such as Pulte Homes,
Lennar Corporation, and Centex Corporation. These ﬁrms are capable of
moving their operations into a city quickly if they perceive the ability to
build homes for less than the going price. However, there are important
barriers to their moving into certain cities, as executives from these ﬁrms
will animatedly tell you. In many mature cities there is no place to build,
and obtaining permits can be long and costly. Case has argued that differ-
ences in supply elasticity across cities explained a larger percentage of
price changes than do demographics.21 Clearly, prices of homes can go up
more rapidly than building costs only if supply is inelastic at least in the
short run. 
Zoning restrictions are an important barrier to the construction of new
homes. These restrictions prevent more intensive use of available land,
for example by building more closely spaced houses or taller high-rise
apartment buildings. Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko have shown a
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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derived from the Wharton Land Use Control Survey and the ratio of exist-
ing housing prices to the cost of new construction.22 They found that there
is relatively little correlation between population density and home prices,
even though economic theory might seem to suggest such a correlation.
Thus zoning has been fundamental in limiting the supply of housing. 
Even if shortages of places to build are long lasting, in the longer run
positive impulses to employment can, if there are barriers to the supply
response, lead to outﬂow of industries that have little reason to stay in the
city, thereby eventually reversing the high demand for homes. At the
height of a boom, both labor supply and labor demand can be negative fac-
tors, with high home prices deterring workers from coming to an area and
a labor shortage deterring industry from locating there. Moreover, retirees
and families with children (who have higher housing demand) will tend
eventually to leave high-price cities. Thus cities that have attracted certain
industries and have seen a surge in employment eventually become more
specialized: Silicon Valley, for example, has become almost exclusively a
mecca for people who need to beneﬁt from the synergies of the electron-
ics industry. 
This process can eventually reverse the price increases. This process of
reversal, however, is hardly on the minds of most homebuyers, who, as
we have seen, are preoccupied with relatively simplistic stories about
housing when they consider their investments. The relatively poor perfor-
mance of their city after the boom comes as a surprise to them.
Over long intervals in most states, the growth rate of home prices has
tended to track growth in nominal income per capita. It is not surprising
that this should be so, for two reasons. First, land zoned for new construc-
tion in scarce or important locations is ﬁxed, and if people target a frac-
tion of their income for the costs of a home, given ﬁxed supply the price
of that ﬁxed land should increase with income. Second, construction
costs, which are mostly labor costs, tend to track income per capita as
well. Thus, over the period from 1980 to 2000, price growth in Los Ange-
les and price growth in Milwaukee have been about the same. But there is
a big difference in the shorter-run behavior of prices in those two cities. 
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income per capita, along with the tendency for home price decreases to be
slow and sluggish, has meant that relatively few citywide home price
declines have been observed in history. More often one sees periods of
ﬂat real estate prices, where the ratio of price to income, or the ratio of
price to the consumer price index, is falling but nominal prices them-
selves have not fallen. Outright price declines are much more salient in
investor psychology than failures of prices to keep up with income. Thus
popular culture has not identiﬁed bubbles as a problem in real estate, or
did not until last year. 
The popular impression has been that real estate is an investment that
cannot lose money. The declines in prices in the early 1990s in many
cities, documented for the ﬁrst time in history by accurate real estate price
indexes developed by us and others, have forever reduced the salience of
this public impression, but, as our latest survey documents, the idea still
lingers. There is also a popular impression that real estate is a candidate
for the “best investment” that can be made (see top panel of table 12).
Whether real estate is in fact the best possible investment is not something
amenable to economic analysis, since one cannot measure the “dividend”
in the form of housing services that homes offer. Presumably there is
diminishing marginal utility to owning a bigger and bigger house, and so
the psychic dividend declines with the amount of house purchased. The
basic question that individuals must resolve is how big a house to buy,
and the theory that “housing is always the best investment” is a poor clue
to how to answer this question. Yet that theory has a salience that is quite
strong in the current market.
Is a Housing Bubble about to Burst?
Clearly, one can construct an argument that home price increases
nationally since 1995 have been driven by fundamentals. For more than
forty states, income growth alone explains virtually the entire increase in
housing prices, and falling interest rates have reduced financing costs
sufficiently to keep the ratio of annual mortgage payments to income
from rising even in the boom states of Massachusetts and California. In
the vast majority of states, housing is actually more affordable than it was
in 1995. 
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ble in single-family home prices—the strong investment motive, the high
expectations of future price increases, and the strong inﬂuence of word-
of-mouth discussion—exist in some cities. For the three glamour cities
we studied, the indicators of bubble sentiment that we documented in
tables 8 and 9 remain, in general, nearly as strong in 2003 as they were in
1988. Some of these are surprisingly high in 2003, notably the ten-year
expectations for future price change, where the average expected annual
price increase is in the 13 to 15 percent range for all these cities. Even our
fourth city, Milwaukee, is perhaps showing some bubble sentiment, for the
expected annual price increase for the next ten years there is 11.7 percent.
All of the fundamental measures of bubble activity—the expectations,
the sense of opportunity and urgency, the excitement and amount of
talk—are generally down from their levels in 1988 in the glamour cities,
but up from their levels of 1988 in Milwaukee. (Long-run expectations,
however, are generally up substantially from 1988. If long-run expecta-
tions matter most, one might say that the 2003 exuberance is just as strong
as the 1988 one.) Most people do not perceive themselves in 2003 as in
the midst of a bubble, despite all the media attention to the possibility.
However, neither did people perceive themselves to be in a bubble in
1988, after which real prices fell sharply in many cities.
Although these indicators do not suggest such strong evidence of a
bubble as was observed in 1988, it is reasonable to suppose that, in the
near future, price increases will stall and that prices will even decline in
some cities. We have seen that people are not as conﬁdent of real estate
prices as they were even before the 1980s real estate bubble burst, and this
lack of conﬁdence may translate into an ampliﬁcation of any price
declines. Real home prices are already ﬂat in Denver and Detroit, follow-
ing periods of rapid growth. More declines in real home prices will prob-
ably come in cities that have been frothy, notably including some cities on
both coasts of the United States, and especially those that have weakening
economies. But declines in real estate prices might appear even in cities
whose employment holds steady.
The consequences of such a fall in home prices would be severe for
some homeowners. Given the high average level of personal debt relative
to personal income, an increase in bankruptcies is likely. Such an increase
could potentially worsen consumer conﬁdence, creating a renewed inter-
est in replenishing savings. 
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far in the current recovery, may drop, stalling the recovery. However,
judging from the historical record, a nationwide drop in real housing
prices is unlikely, and the drops in different cities are not likely to be syn-
chronous: some will probably not occur for a number of years. Such a
lack of synchrony would blunt the impact on the aggregate economy of
the bursting of housing bubbles.
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Discussion
Christopher Mayer: It is an honor to discuss this paper. I had not yet
started graduate school when Karl Case and Robert Shiller wrote their
ﬁrst paper together. After ﬁnishing graduate school, I took my ﬁrst job at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, where Case was then a visiting
scholar. He and I had many discussions about the housing market, and we
coauthored several papers. The output of those conversations remains
with me today.
I will begin with a brief summary of the paper’s ﬁndings, focusing on
my interpretations of the authors’ principal results and on the strengths
(and limitations) of their data. I will also examine why there is currently a
popular perception of a housing market bubble. On this point I will con-
sider a couple of issues that get less attention in this paper and that might
give a slightly different perspective on its ﬁndings, namely, the role of
nominal interest rates and expected inﬂation. I will conclude with some
comments about whether we should be worried about a housing bust
today.
summary of ﬁndings. The ﬁrst striking fact to note in this paper is
how stable the home price-to-income ratio is in many parts of the country
(the authors’ tables 1 and 2). In most states the difference between the
minimum and the maximum price-to-income ratio is between 10 and
20 percent of its median value over the sample period. These numbers
suggest a strong relationship, with little variation, between home prices
and a simple (univariate) proxy for demand. These statistics argue against
the popular perception (including that of many economists) that housing
markets are excessively volatile.
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ratio is quite volatile. Case and Shiller examine eight such states and
show that the fundamentals appear to explain much less of the variability
in home prices (or the home price-to-income ratio) over time. Although
one might say that eight out of ﬁfty states is not a large number, these
eight states include the most valuable real estate in the country. I would
not be surprised if these eight states (which include California, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, and New York) account for a majority of total home
value in the United States.
Another difference between these eight states and the rest of the coun-
try is where the economies of those states stand today. In none of the eight
states is the home price-to-income ratio as high as it was in the late 1980s.
However, that fact in and of itself is not necessarily cause for optimism,
because home prices fell in those eight states in the aftermath of the runup
that led to those high ratios. At the same time, many of the other states,
although their prices have been less volatile, have a home price-to-income
ratio that appears at or near its historic peak in the Case and Shiller data. 
Most of the paper describes results from two surveys of recent home-
buyers that the authors conducted in 1988 and 2003 in four metropolitan
areas. As one who has been citing their 1988 survey results for a long
time, I was excited to discover that they had updated the survey. This is a
great time to conduct a follow-up study, although it would have been even
more interesting to see a comparison from a bust year in the early 1990s
as well. In the previous survey I was always struck by the cross-sectional
comparison between homeowners’ high expectations of price apprecia-
tion in the booming metropolitan areas of Boston, Orange County, and
San Francisco and the more moderate expectations of homeowners in
Milwaukee. 
When compared with the earlier survey results, the 2003 ﬁndings, with
one real exception, are relatively unchanged. Although some of the num-
bers went up or down a little bit, most of the changes are likely to be
within the standard error bounds from the previous ﬁndings. The excep-
tion is that a preponderance of the homebuyers in Milwaukee expressed
higher expectations of home price appreciation than did Milwaukee
homebuyers in the previous survey, despite the fact that Milwaukee home
prices have not boomed to the same extent as those in the other locations
surveyed. However, in discussions with the authors I learned that the dif-
ferences in means that are cited in the paper are considerably more strik-
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the Milwaukee sample for the next ten years is about 5 percent a year, and
that for some of the other cities is 7 or 8 percent—still fairly high, but not
quite as outlandish as the mean expectations, which exceed 10 percent in
all four metropolitan areas in the 2003 survey.
Other results in the paper seem reasonable to me, even if they seem
less so to the authors. Homeowners perceive housing to be a stable invest-
ment relative to the stock market. One reason is that they recognize that
no matter what happens to the price of housing, they still get to live in
their home. This observation makes a lot of sense when comparing hous-
ing with stocks, because stocks pay very low and variable (and sometimes
no) dividends. So, when stock prices fall, as they have recently, owners of
stocks are hurt. In contrast, the dividend in the housing market is tangible.
Most of the ﬁnancial return from a house comes from getting to live in the
house, not from the expected capital gain. (After all, average real home
prices increased just 1.2 percent a year between 1975 and 2000, according
to data from OFHEO.) Whether or not the price of that house goes up or
down, the owner still realizes consumption value. Academic economists
debate how to measure that value, and how it co-varies with the value of
housing. But, from the perspective of most homeowners, who cannot eas-
ily hedge their housing investments, that consumption ﬂow is unchanged
over cycles in the housing market. Todd Sinai and Nick Souleles have
written a compelling paper showing how home ownership can serve as an
effective hedge against real estate cycles and the volatility of rent, which
suggests that homeowners may also get other beneﬁts relative to renters in
the housing market.1 Case and Shiller’s survey suggests that some home-
owners perceive the value of a home as coming from consumption, and
that the housing market is less risky than the stock market. These ﬁndings
seem perfectly reasonable for most U.S. homeowners. 
Another major result from the survey (to which I will return at the
end) is that home prices are sticky. This certainly appears to be true. I
have done some work with David Genesove showing that loss aversion
and liquidity constraints can help explain sticky home prices, at least
during busts.2 A third factor appears to be that people are just very slow
to adjust their reservation prices. This slow adjustment may have to do
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rent asking prices. 
The paper suggests that one should not expect large declines in home
prices, even in the most volatile states, if demand for housing falls. How-
ever, there is some inconsistency between this claim and the observation
that these states have volatile home price-to-income ratios. In addition,
these are places where nominal housing prices have in fact fallen in the
past. Finally, my previous work in this area suggests that even if prices
are sticky, the number of transactions can fall considerably, which, as the
paper notes, could lead to considerable macroeconomic distress.
technical issues. A few technical issues are worth considering,
although they are not critical to interpreting the results in this paper. For
example, the use of state-level home price indexes is likely to underesti-
mate the volatility of home prices in metropolitan areas. However, reli-
able income data do not exist at the metropolitan level, which necessitates
the state-level analysis. Also, the OFHEO home price indexes that are
used for most of the states miss the high end of the market, because they
are based on sales of homes with “conforming loans,” which exclude the
highest-priced homes in the country. Indexes from OFHEO may well
understate the price increases for high-priced homes, which have clearly
been larger relative to those for low-priced homes, and this bias might be
greater in the highest-priced areas. So the OFHEO data almost certainly
understate the extent of price increases and underestimate volatility,
because the values of high-priced homes are typically more volatile than
those of low-priced homes.3
Also, as John Quigley notes in his comment, supply clearly matters.
However, I will start with the same premise that the authors implicitly do:
that the supply of housing is inelastic, at least in the eight volatile states.
If this assumption were not true, and the supply of housing were perfectly
elastic, we would have nothing to talk about. Home prices would be 
driven by the sum of construction cost and the opportunity cost of land
(that is, its value in agricultural use). The fact that any demand-side vari-
ables are correlated with home prices provides evidence that supply is not
perfectly elastic. 
Another issue relates to Case and Shiller’s observation that consumers
do not typically describe empirical evidence or use sophisticated ideas
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choice, because there are no appreciable data available to them (or to
researchers) that can be used to study local home prices. The authors
started a wonderful company that generates high-quality local price
indexes, but their data are not widely disseminated. When I go to the
Internet to ﬁnd home price indexes for individual metropolitan areas, the
OFHEO data are the only data available. I cannot easily get data from
Case, Shiller, and Weiss to describe local markets. And the typical real
estate broker does not really understand what a price index is, let alone
have any reliable data. So it is not very surprising that, in the stock mar-
ket, people talk about price-earnings ratios, but in the housing market they
do not. The data are not available. One could say that that is endogenous,
but nonetheless, even sophisticated buyers and sellers are limited in this
market by poor data. 
why do consumers “think” there is a housing bubble? An issue
that Case and Shiller raise early in the paper is the perception in the media
that the United States is in a housing bubble. This perception is puzzling
in that a lot of economists, at least, do not seem to see a lot of evidence of
a bubble. Here I consider two related issues that might affect this percep-
tion: the role of interest rates and the role of expected inﬂation.
Many observers have commented that the housing market really is a
regional or even a local market. That has certainly been true in the past.
Yet in the last several years there has been much more of a common fac-
tor in the movement of home prices in many different parts of the country.
Most observers point to historically low interest rates as that common
factor.
When I have run regressions of home prices on the user cost of housing,
I have typically found a remarkably low coefﬁcient on user costs. That is,
it seems as if, historically, housing purchase behavior and housing values
have not been very responsive to changes in interest rates. (An alternative
hypothesis is that user costs are poorly measured, which is probably true
as well.) But the recent data on home prices reveal historically unprece-
dented patterns. I do not know of a previous recession in which home
prices increased as the economy turned down. I see almost nothing else
that one can point to besides interest rates to explain rising home prices at
a time of falling employment and incomes. One implication is that, if
interest rates rise from their current low levels, the housing market could
suffer more broadly than it has in the past when interest rates rose. 
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ception of a housing bubble. In the forty-two states with relatively stable
home price-to-income ratios, that ratio is at or near its peak of the last
thirty years in almost all. For the eight remaining, high-volatility states,
the home price-to-income ratio is high, but not as high as it was in the late
1980s or early 1990s, just before home prices began a dramatic fall in
these states. However, this fact might provide only limited comfort for
homeowners in these states, because the past housing bust was severe in
states such as California and Massachusetts.
Another, related fact is that the commercial real estate market exhibits
a pattern similar to that in the housing market. Commercial real estate
prices have been setting new highs even as rents have been falling. This is
unusual in that the commercial real estate market rarely mirrors the hous-
ing market. Some observers have suggested that this represents another
bubble, and many well-known commercial real estate owners have pub-
licly announced that they are selling assets in the United States. 
Figure 1 below shows real home prices nationally over roughly the last
quarter century. (These data come from OFHEO, as do most of the data
used in this comment, and so they are subject to the biases I discussed ear-
lier.) What is striking in this ﬁgure is that, unlike in previous business
cycles, home prices did not turn down in 2000 when the expansion ended.
It is difﬁcult to come up with convincing explanations for this fact. Strik-
ingly, when I examine some of the explanations that other people have
raised, it turns out that theory would predict the opposite effect.
interest rates and real home prices. Consider today’s historically
low interest rates. The standard metric used to consider the impact of
interest rates on real estate values is the user cost of housing,4 which is
deﬁned as the rental cost of a unit of housing divided by the price of hous-
ing, as follows:
In words, the user cost equals 1 minus the marginal tax rate, multiplied by
the nominal interest rate (which here is decomposed into the real interest
rate r plus expected inﬂation πe) plus property taxes τp. To this are added
depreciation and a risk premium, and the expected rate of appreciation of
housing is subtracted off. 
R P MTR r HH
e
p H
e /( – )( ) – . =+ + + + 1 πτ δ α π
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(πe
H) will increase one for one with expected inﬂation in the economy as a
whole (πe). Using that relationship and examining the user cost model fur-
ther yields two interesting predictions. The ﬁrst is that decreases in
expected inﬂation lead to a higher user cost of housing and thus lower
(real) home prices. The reason is that homeowners get to deduct nominal
interest payments from taxable income. A decline in expected inﬂation by
∆πe decreases the rate of growth of home prices by ∆πe but lowers inter-
est costs by only (1 – MTR)∆πe. Thus the net effect of a decline in
expected inﬂation is to increase the after-tax user cost of housing.
Empirical evidence supports the opposite prediction: that higher
expected inﬂation is associated with higher real home prices. James
Poterba presented a Brookings Paper in 1991 showing that home price
increases were relatively larger for higher-priced homes than for lower-
priced homes in the early 1980s, when expected inﬂation had increased.5
This evidence is consistent with the (after-tax) user cost model in that
owners of higher-priced homes face a higher marginal tax rate and thus
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priced homes, many of whom do not even itemize their deductions and
thus get no beneﬁt from the tax deductibility of mortgage interest
expense.
So, from a theoretical perspective, decreases in expected inﬂation
should be bad for real home prices. My ﬁgure 2 presents data from the
Livingston survey on expected inﬂation. These data show a slow and
steady decline in expected inﬂation over the last ﬁfteen years. Contrary to
the popular perception, low expected inﬂation should be bad for the hous-
ing market, not good. 
The survey results from the Case and Shiller paper provide no evidence
that consumers have lowered their expectations of home price increases in
line with lower expected inﬂation in 2003 relative to 1988. Expected
annual inﬂation has declined from 5 percent to just under 2 percent today,
according to projections of what the Livingston survey is likely to show
for 2003. Yet consumers in the Case and Shiller survey seem to have had
similar expectations of (nominal) home price increases in both 1988 and
2003. If anything, their expectations in 2003 are even higher. 
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Figure 2. Expected Rate of Inﬂation, 1971–2002
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home prices or consumers’ predictions of a relatively high growth rate for
home prices. Alternatively, one can also look at changes in real mortgage
rates. After all, low real mortgage rates will lead to higher real home
prices. My ﬁgure 3 traces nominal and real mortgage rates over the last
thirty-one years. Although nominal rates are at or near historic lows, and
real mortgage rates are low as well, real rates are not quite as low as they
were for much of the 1970s. Of course, real mortgage rates have fallen in
the last four years, mirroring the rise in real home prices.
The question is, Which should matter more, nominal rates or real rates?
Or, alternatively, why might low nominal rates spur the housing market?
As I mentioned earlier, regressions on historical data do not show an enor-
mous impact of real interest rates on home prices, and real home prices
have always fallen in previous recessions.
Low nominal interest rates are the only factor that I can point to that
might explain the recent surge in home prices during a recession. One
could argue that consumers are confusing nominal and real interest rates.
One way that this might happen is if consumers (or lenders) target a ﬁxed
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nominal rates allow people to afford more housing.
A skeptic might point out that consumers have always been liquidity
constrained, or at least that has been the conclusion of many academic
studies. So what is different today? One possibility is that lenders have
become much more aggressive and are willing to make loans to con-
sumers who make very low down payments. Thus the down payment con-
straint no longer binds today; instead the income constraint is binding.
But if this model is correct, the immediate conclusion is that as soon as
nominal interest rates rise again, people will be able to afford less housing
for a ﬁxed payment-to-income ratio, and home prices will fall. Of course,
this model assumes that home prices are not forward-looking.
There are many reasons to be skeptical of a model in which demand for
housing is generated by a ﬁxed payment-to-income ratio. For example,
this model clearly does not hold when one examines cross-sectional data
for U.S. metropolitan areas, which show that consumers do not have a
ﬁxed ratio of housing costs to income. Evidence suggests that homeown-
ers and renters spend a higher percentage of income in high-priced areas
like San Francisco than in low-priced ones like Milwaukee. So, at least
cross-sectionally, this theory does not hold. Whether it is true within met-
ropolitan areas, one could make some arguments. Although it is hard to
believe in a target payment-to-income ratio completely, it is the only
model that I can come up with that predicts that lower nominal interest
rates will lead to higher home prices. 
long-run home price growth rates across cities. Case and
Shiller point out that people in places where home prices have risen sub-
stantially, such as San Francisco and Boston, have higher expectations for
home prices in the future than do people in places where home prices
have risen slowly. These expectations are not as crazy as one might think.
I am working on a research project with Joseph Gyourko and Todd Sinai
examining the factors that lead to long-run differences in home price
appreciation across U.S. metropolitan areas. Using census data from 1940
to 1970, we show that, nationwide, real home prices increased by 2 per-
cent a year on average, whereas real home prices in San Francisco and
Boston grew by 3.9 percent and 3.1 percent a year, respectively. Far from
being a temporary trend, these patterns accelerated between 1975 and
2000, according to data from OFHEO, when real home prices rose annu-
ally by 4.6 percent in San Francisco, 3.4 percent in Boston, and only
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not a fact of life in all places. Real home prices fell in cities such as Hous-
ton, Fort Worth, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach. 
Since 1975 the real price of housing in San Francisco relative to the
rest of the country has gone up 250 percent, which a skeptic might say is
unprecedented, except that the same thing happened in the previous thirty
years as well. San Francisco has been a place where home prices have
continued to go up at above-average rates. Given this sixty-year trend, it
is not unreasonable for consumers to expect this pattern to continue.7
is a bubble about to burst? What about the question that matters
most at the end of the day: Will real home prices fall? I think there are
warning signs out there. The survey evidence looks pretty consistent. The
level of home prices as well as the home price-to-income ratio is high in
many places. 
If ﬁxed payment-to-income ratios are at all important in the mortgage
market, to lenders or borrowers, then any appreciable increase in mort-
gage rates (or any decrease in lending or tightening of mortgage stan-
dards) could have a negative impact on home prices. Although historical
data would not predict a decline in home prices, there may be reasons why
the situation is different now than in the past. 
The ﬁrst sign of a decline in demand for housing would be a fall in
sales of single-family houses. Case and Shiller argue that nominal home
price declines are rare and that declines in sales volume are more com-
mon. Yet although nominal home prices have never fallen at the national
level, nominal prices have fallen in many metropolitan areas.
Case and Shiller suggest that policymakers should look at changes in
sales volume if demand for housing falls. Even if sales volume falls
before prices do, eventually prices will catch up. This observation is
based on extensive research that Genesove and I have done in the Boston
condominium market, where prices fell 40 percent in three years.8
Although asking prices were sticky at ﬁrst, and homeowners preferred to
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ally asking prices did catch up to the market. 
In the Dallas condominium market, nominal prices fell almost 60 per-
cent during the bust. In the Boston area, nominal prices in the overall
housing market fell about 17 percent over three years. Thus nominal
home prices can fall. The question is what is going on with the underlying
economics. I wish I were a little more conﬁdent in the underlying eco-
nomics of the housing market right now.
John M. Quigley: This paper by Karl Case and Robert Shiller makes
provocative and sober reading in an economy mired in a postrecession
nonrecovery and in which the implications of recent changes in tax and
expenditure policies are just beginning to be sorted out. The authors raise
the question of whether the recent run-up in the U.S. housing market is a
manifestation of an irrational bubble, which will put the economy at some
risk when it is eventually popped. In contrast to most of the recent litera-
ture in the bubble genre (and there has been a lot), this paper presents
some original empirical analysis that is relevant, at least arguably, to the
existence of a bubble in asset prices.
The paper makes three contributions. First, it clears the air by deﬁning
what an asset bubble really is. In much popular discussion and in the
analyses presented in the ﬁnancial press, abnormal price increases alone
are sufﬁcient to signify a bubble in the asset market. Case and Shiller sug-
gest instead that an asset bubble appears when current prices depend upon
expectations of future price increases. In this circumstance, when expec-
tations change—perhaps on the basis of rumor or a mere shred of hard
information—current prices may decline precipitously. Thus, measuring
expectations is relevant. Second, the authors document recent trends in
home prices at the state level and the course of home prices, home price
changes, and income-to-home price ratios. For forty-two of the ﬁfty
states, the course of income is sufﬁcient to explain price movements. For
the eight remaining states, other economic variables add explanatory
power, but these variables (what the authors call the “fundamentals”)
yield forecasts of home prices for 2000–02 that are lower than those actu-
ally observed.
Third, and most important, Case and Shiller report the results of a sur-
vey mailed to 500 home purchasers in four different metropolitan areas.
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and provide a wealth of survey information about what people say they
think when considering buying a home.
Case and Shiller show that investment motives are clearly important
among home buyers, although they remark somewhat bizarrely that this is
a “deﬁning characteristic of a housing bubble.” They document that per-
ceptions of risk are real and that risk is perceived to be more important in
2003 than it appeared to be in similar research they conducted in 1988.
Case and Shiller also document that recent homebuyers expected sub-
stantial price increases during their ﬁrst year of occupancy, even in Mil-
waukee, and that they expected really amazing ten-year gains. Average
one-year price increases are expected to be 7 to 11 percent. Average ten-
year price expectations are a good bit higher, about 12 to 16 percent a year
in these markets. People also generally view housing investment as an
escalator—if you don’t buy now, you won’t be able to buy later. 
The findings and the accompanying discussion make fascinating read-
ing, and the authors are to be congratulated for their hard work in data
collection and presentation. I do think the authors greatly overinterpret
the consistency of their findings with the presence of an asset bubble,
however.
Consider the dominant motive for house purchase—investment—and
the escalator nature of the investment. Case and Shiller interpret these
survey responses as evidence of a bubble in the current market. But ever
since the Federal Housing Administration and the institution of the ﬁxed-
rate, level-payment, self-amortizing mortgage came into being, home
buying has been like a Christmas club: it represents a long-term payment
contract with serious penalties for not following through with regularly
scheduled investments. The payments are for “shelter,” and the “invest-
ment” is painless. Of course, the housing market is an escalator. It is
impossible to force yourself to save enough money so that you can buy
the home tomorrow. These psychological aspects of the housing contract
and saving behavior do not depend upon any price appreciation at all.
Price increases are just a bonus. This is what your father told you. 
Consider the perception that housing is a risky investment. Case and
Shiller seem to interpret this as evidence of a bubble. But housing is the
largest item in most household portfolios, and no methods are widely
available to hedge the concentrated risk. It would be ironic if these two
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since both have been at the forefront in devising derivatives so that con-
sumers may diversify the risks of homeownership. 
The evidence on price expectations is quite disturbing, especially the
fact that people think annual ten-year price increases will exceed one-year
price increases. I do wonder if this is a manifestation of a bubble, or just
the popular misunderstanding of compound interest. Might the response
have been different if the equivalent question had been asked: Do you
think your home will quadruple in value in nine years?
My interpretation of their conclusion is “Despite popular discussion of
housing bubbles, most buyers in these four markets do not perceive one
currently.”
The big reason for concern about price increases for housing assets is
the perceived analogy between the run-up and crash in the stock market
and the current price increases experienced in the housing market. How
compelling is that analogy?
The long-run relationship between housing costs and construction
costs casts doubt on the analogy. The average price of new housing
moved in tandem with engineering measures of housing construction
costs (excluding land) until about 1987. Thereafter the price of newly
built housing began to increase. By the end of the 1990s, new houses cost
about 25 percent more than construction costs.1 Have we had a housing
bubble for the past ﬁfteen years?
I think that there are at least eight reasons to question the existence, or
at least the importance, of a bubble in the housing market in 2003. First,
housing demand is sensitive to income. Case and Shiller discuss the role
of income in detail. Based on their state-by-state analysis, in only a couple
of states—but big ones—is there any divergence seen between incomes
and housing prices.
Second, housing demand is sensitive to price. The user cost of capital
is the annual price at which these assets are enjoyed by homeowners.
These costs include depreciation and maintenance, property taxes, real
interest rates, federal income tax rates, the rate of capital gains, and inﬂa-
tion. Steven Raphael and I have estimated the course of user costs during
the past quarter century.2 Even if one ignores capital gains, the trends are
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est rates, user costs had been declining. In fact, user costs have declined
secularly since about 1980. When costs decline, the demand for an asset
goes up. 
Third, there is reason to believe that household formation, population
aging, and immigration will increase the demand for shelter, for
dwellings, and for owner-occupied housing. Forecasts are for 1.2 million
new households a year to be created over the next decade.3 These trends
can be expected to stimulate demand for housing, as older households
continue to resist downsizing, as the rapidly growing demand for home-
ownership increases, and as the “echo boomers” (the children of the baby-
boom generation) enter the market. One celebrated error of the late 1980s,
the forecast of a 47 percent fall in housing prices,4 arose because these
kinds of demographic changes were ignored.
Fourth, the operation of land markets and the spatial concentration of
growing metropolitan areas make built-up areas in desirable housing mar-
kets even more valuable. Most of the growth in metropolitan areas, indeed
most of the economic activity in America, is coastal. Coastal metropolitan
areas are not like the concentric circles of housing markets shown in text-
books. For a given amount of economic activity, the extensive margin is
farther out from the city center. Savings in transport costs and increases in
amenities are greater for close-in properties. Prices get bid up to reﬂect
these transport savings and amenity differences.
Furthermore, most of these concentrations of growth are in the South
and the West. For a variety of reasons to which Case and Shiller allude, it
is almost illegal to build new dwellings in the West, especially in Califor-
nia. California has smart growth and growth controls. There are moratori-
ums on new construction—it is hard for a developer to build until you get
as far inland as the Central Valley. 
Fifth, in the housing market more than in other asset markets, the tim-
ing of transactions is affected by a reluctance to realize losses. The trade-
off between the selling price of a dwelling and time on the market is well
recognized, and the other discussant for this paper has documented loss
aversion.5 Housing prices are sticky downward. Prices are slow to
decline.
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markets, such as the market for equity shares or for tulip bulbs. The
turnover rate for publicly traded stocks is ﬁfteen times the rate for houses.
Selling costs are high (5 or 6 percent in brokerage), moving costs are
high, and the psychological costs of moving among neighborhoods,
schools, and so on are not trivial. It should come as no surprise that there
are few day traders in housing. 
Seventh, none of these intertemporal price comparisons take into
account quality improvements in housing. Quality improvements are
reckoned at about 1.3 percent a year. This affects the comparison and
interpretation of price changes, at least in the longer run.
Eighth, markets are local. The fortunes of real property are intimately
connected to the goods and services produced in different metropolitan
areas, and the specialization of cities varies. (There are hints of this in the
blunt state-by-state regressions presented by Case and Shiller.) Recall that
the closest thing to a real and precipitous decline in housing prices in
recent decades was the Texas bust of the late 1980s. Oil had gone from an
average of $18 a barrel in 1979 to an average of $35 a barrel in 1981, and
single-family housing construction tripled shortly thereafter. Then oil
prices crashed, and so did housing prices. This was an oil price bubble,
perhaps, but hardly a housing bubble. Asset prices are only imperfectly
correlated across markets, making large aggregate declines unlikely. Dur-
ing the past two decades, 58 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas had at
least one one-year price decline of 10 percent or more. But in only one
year did aggregate U.S. housing prices decline—by 0.9 percent in 1991.
A 10 percent decline in housing values nationally would thus require
some very large declines in some markets. But suppose a 10 percent
decline did occur. How would this affect household consumption? As of
last December, the aggregate value of residential housing was estimated
at $13.7 trillion, and aggregate mortgage debt was a bit over $6 trillion,
leaving $7.6 trillion in equity. A 10 percent national decline in home val-
ues would reduce equity by $1.4 trillion, to $6.2 trillion. This would
reduce aggregate homeowner equity to its level at the end of 1999.
To estimate the effects of such a decline on consumption, one can
apply one’s preferred wealth effect coefﬁcients to this equity change. My
favorite is the 0.5 to 1.0 percent estimate of Case, Quigley, and Shiller.6
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thing like a reduction of one-sixth of 1 percent of annual consumer spend-
ing. This is not trivial, but it is not a large effect either.
General discussion: The authors’ interpretation of the survey responses
received considerable attention. Martin Baily disagreed with the authors’
view that respondents’ answers to certain questions reﬂected confusion,
because the distinction in the questions between levels and rates of
change was not as clean as the authors suggested. Home prices in regions
with inelastic supply should be expected to rise more rapidly in response
to growing demand than prices in regions with elastic supply. And it
seems quite reasonable for respondents to assume that supply is relatively
inelastic in cities where “there is just not enough land available.” Growth
in income per capita, for example, should be expected to have a greater
effect on home prices in San Francisco than in Houston. Similarly, it
seems quite reasonable for respondents to view the phrase “because lots
of people want to live here” as indicating expected future growth in hous-
ing demand. Hence Baily did not regard the responses as necessarily
revealing confusion between levels and rates of change. He added that,
with sticky prices, even a demand shock that shifts the long-run equilib-
rium level of prices would be expected to lead to a higher rate of growth
of prices over the short run. Alan Blinder supported the use of household
surveys to try to understand whether a bubble psychology underlay the
housing boom in the glamour states. But he agreed that the wording of
some of the questions about simple theories made it difﬁcult for respon-
dents to know whether a statement was about the level or the rate of
change. Indeed, he thought that many of his students would not have been
sensitive to the difference without tutoring. 
Various panelists criticized the empirical analysis of the importance of
fundamentals in determining home prices. William Brainard believed the
authors had not treated interest rates adequately. He was puzzled that the
equations explaining changes in prices did not use ﬁrst differences of
variables in the level equations. In particular, they used the level of the
mortgage rate in both the level and the change equations. Brainard won-
dered whether the change in the mortgage rate would do a better job of
explaining the change in price. Agreeing with Baily, Jeffrey Frankel
noted that variables such as population and growth in income per capita
should have larger effects in regions with relatively inelastic housing
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cients on variables such as growth in income per capita and population to
differ across regions, but only by a common factor. Blinder would have
liked to know more about trends in the purchase price-to-rental ratio. In
cities like San Francisco stocks of rental and owner-occupied housing are
quite similar in character. In these circumstances, rental income and its
rate of growth may be good measures of the value of housing services of
owner-occupied houses. Alan Auerbach agreed that looking at the price-
to-rental ratio would be informative. Rising prices alone do not prove the
existence of a bubble; a bubble exists only if prices increase more than
what the economic fundamentals justify. A simple way to check this
would be to see if the price-to-rental ratio is consistent, given interest
rates, with the rate of growth of rentals. 
Benjamin Friedman noted that the sample of respondents apparently
included both ﬁrst-time buyers and households that are trading up or
down. He would have liked to see questions that clearly distinguished
between these two groups, for whom the implications of expectations of
rapidly rising prices are obviously quite different. Christopher Sims
observed that the R2 between two slowly moving series is expected to be
very high. Because income is a very stable time series, the fact that R2s are
high in markets where volatility is low, and lower in more volatile mar-
kets, adds little to the discussion.
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